A “Composite Utterances” approach to meaning

📇 Index

Metadaten – PDF, PDF 2

Enfield, N. J. 2013. 44. A “Composite Utterances” approach to meaning. In Cornelia Müller, Alan Cienki, Ellen Fricke, Silva Ladewig, David McNeill & Sedinha Tessendorf (eds.), Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft / Handbooks of Linguistics and Communication Science (HSK), vol. 38, 689–707. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER. 9783110261318.689.

Imported: 2023-04-30 12:09

⭐ Main

Highlight ( p. 689)

In human social behavior, people build communicative sequences move by move. Communication as a sequence of semiotic inputs that have to be grouped and packaged to be interpreted

Highlight ( p. 689)

By what means does an interpreter take multiple signs and draw them together into unified, meaningful packages?

Highlight ( p. 690)

Meaning does not begin with language

Highlight ( p. 690)

we take signs to be public elements of cognitive processes (Peirce 1955), evidence of others’ communicative intentions (Grice 1957, 1975). Our clues for figuring out those intentions are found not only in conventional symbols like words, but in the rich iconic-indexical relations

Highlight ( p. 690)

Meaning is dynamic, motivated, and concrete

Highlight ( p. 690)

A sign has meaning because it specifies a standing-for relation between a signifier and a signified.

Highlight ( p. 690)

But there is reason to question whether a view of signs as static, arbitrary, and abstract is an adequate depiction

Highlight ( p. 690)

There is reason to stay closer to the source, to see signs as they are, first and foremost: dynamic, motivated, and concrete (Hanks 1990)

Highlight ( p. 691)

Meaning is a composite notion

Highlight ( p. 691)

when encountering multiple signs which are presented together, take them as one.

Highlight ( p. 695)

A line of research in developmental psychology has identified the onset of the pointing gesture as a watershed moment in the development of human social cognitive and communicative capacities, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically (Bates, Camaioni, and Volterra 1975; Bates, O’Connell, and Shore 1987; Liszkowski et al. 2004; Tomasello 2006). The pointing gesture is mastered by prelinguistic infants (by around 12 months of age) and it is the first type of move to unequivocally display the sort of shared intentionality unique to human communication and social cognition (Frith and Frith 2007; Liszkowski 2006; Tomasello et al. 2005)

Highlight ( p. 695)

Three types of sign are important in interpreting composite utterances: conventional signs, non-conventional signs, and symbolic indexicals.

Highlight ( p. 697)

Linguistic items like words are often described merely in terms of what they conventionally encode (as standing for lexical types), while gestures are typically described in terms of what they non-conventionally convey (as standing for utterance-level tokens of informative intention). In other words, the interpreter’s problem of comprehending word meaning is taken to be one of recognition (from token form to type lexical entry), while the problem of comprehending gesture meaning is taken to be one of interpretation (from token form to token informative intention).

Highlight ( p. 698)

Sign filtration: Triggers and heuristics

Highlight ( p. 698)

interpreter can solve the problem of sign filtration, i.e., that they can parse out from a flux of impressions those things that are to be taken as signs in the first place. This filtration is assisted by triggers

Highlight ( p. 698)

must be recognizable as addressed, that is, being produced by a person for the sake of its interpretation

Highlight ( p. 699)

convention heuristic…Symbols like words may thus be considered as pre-fabricated semiotic processes: their very existence is due to their role in communication

Highlight ( p. 699)

orientation heuristic, if a signer is bodily oriented toward you

Highlight ( p. 699)

contextual association heuristic,…Triggers for contextual association are timing and other types of indexical proximity

Highlight ( p. 699)

unified utterance-meaning heuristic, assume that contextually associated signs point to a unified, single, addressed utterance-meaning

Highlight ( p. 699)

agency heuristic, if a signer has greater control over a behaviour

Highlight ( p. 701)

Each type of composite utterance discussed in this book is regulated by its producer’s aim not just to convey some meaning but to bring about a desired understanding in a social other

Highlight ( p. 1)

In human social behavior, people build communicative sequences move by move. Communication as a sequence of semiotic inputs that have to be grouped and packaged to be interpreted

Highlight ( p. 1)

By what means does an interpreter take multiple signs and draw them together into unified, meaningful packages?

Highlight ( p. 2)

Meaning does not begin with language

Highlight ( p. 2)

we take signs to be public elements of cognitive processes (Peirce 1955), evidence of others’ communicative intentions (Grice 1957, 1975). Our clues for figuring out those intentions are found not only in conventional symbols like words, but in the rich iconic-indexical relations

Highlight ( p. 2)

Meaning is dynamic, motivated, and concrete

Highlight ( p. 2)

A sign has meaning because it specifies a standing-for relation between a signifier and a signified.

Highlight ( p. 2)

But there is reason to question whether a view of signs as static, arbitrary, and abstract is an adequate depiction

Highlight ( p. 2)

There is reason to stay closer to the source, to see signs as they are, first and foremost: dynamic, motivated, and concrete (Hanks 1990)

Highlight ( p. 3)

Meaning is a composite notion

Highlight ( p. 3)

when encountering multiple signs which are presented together, take them as one.

Highlight ( p. 7)

A line of research in developmental psychology has identified the onset of the pointing gesture as a watershed moment in the development of human social cognitive and communicative capacities, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically (Bates, Camaioni, and Volterra 1975; Bates, O’Connell, and Shore 1987; Liszkowski et al. 2004; Tomasello 2006). The pointing gesture is mastered by prelinguistic infants (by around 12 months of age) and it is the first type of move to unequivocally display the sort of shared intentionality unique to human communication and social cognition (Frith and Frith 2007; Liszkowski 2006; Tomasello et al. 2005)

Highlight ( p. 7)

Three types of sign are important in interpreting composite utterances: conventional signs, non-conventional signs, and symbolic indexicals.

Highlight ( p. 9)

Linguistic items like words are often described merely in terms of what they conventionally encode (as standing for lexical types), while gestures are typically described in terms of what they non-conventionally convey (as standing for utterance-level tokens of informative intention). In other words, the interpreter’s problem of comprehending word meaning is taken to be one of recognition (from token form to type lexical entry), while the problem of comprehending gesture meaning is taken to be one of interpretation (from token form to token informative intention).

Highlight ( p. 10)

Sign filtration: Triggers and heuristics

Highlight ( p. 10)

interpreter can solve the problem of sign filtration, i.e., that they can parse out from a flux of impressions those things that are to be taken as signs in the first place. This filtration is assisted by triggers

Highlight ( p. 10)

must be recognizable as addressed, that is, being produced by a person for the sake of its interpretation

Highlight ( p. 11)

convention heuristic,…Symbols like words may thus be considered as pre-fabricated semiotic processes: their very existence is due to their role in communication

Highlight ( p. 11)

orientation heuristic, if a signer is bodily oriented toward you

Highlight ( p. 11)

contextual association heuristic,…Triggers for contextual association are timing and other types of indexical proximity

Highlight ( p. 11)

unified utterance-meaning heuristic, assume that contextually associated signs point to a unified, single, addressed utterance-meaning

Highlight ( p. 11)

agency heuristic, if a signer has greater control over a behaviour,

Highlight ( p. 13)

Each type of composite utterance discussed in this book is regulated by its producer’s aim not just to convey some meaning but to bring about a desired understanding in a social other

✅ Definition

Note ( p. 692)

Sentences as composite signs

Highlight ( p. 693)

One view of speech-with-gesture composites is that the relation between co-expressive hand and word is a reciprocal one: “the gestural component and the spoken component interact with one another to create a precise and vivid understanding” (Kendon 2004: 174,

Highlight ( p. 694)

Any utterance is a situated unit of social behaviour with causes (or conditions) and effects (Goffman 1964; Schegloff 1968). An utterance forms as the product of some kind of obligation and ends in the accountability of the speaker towards what they communicated

Note ( p. 694)

also the expectations toward the listener/communicative partner to recognise and respond

Highlight ( p. 694)

While diachronic analysis is concerned with relations between data from different years (with no specified type or directness of causal/conditional relations), enchronic analysis is concerned with relations between data from neighbouring moments, adjacent units of behaviour in locally coherent communicative sequences (typically, conversations).

Highlight ( p. 695)

A move may be defined as a recognizable unit contribution of communicative behaviour constituting a single, complete pushing forward of an interactional sequence by means of making some relevant social action recognizable (e.g., requesting the salt, passing it, saying Thanks).

Highlight ( p. 695)

A conventional…sign is found when people take a certain signifier to stand for a certain signified because that is what members of their community normatively do

Highlight ( p. 696)

Non-conventional signs, by contrast, are found when people take certain signifiers to stand for certain signifieds not because of previous experience with that particular form-meaning pair or from social convention, but where the standing-for relation between form and meaning comes about by virtue of just that singular event of interpretation.

Highlight ( p. 696)

The symbolic indexical is a hybrid of the two types conventialized form, contextual meaning

Highlight ( p. 696)

But only conventional signs (including conventional components of symbolic indexicals) necessarily have both type and token identities.

Highlight ( p. 697)

we may define the composite utterance as a communicative move that incorporates multiple signs of multiple types

Highlight ( p. 699)

A relation of a sign standing for an object is iconic when the sign is taken to stand for the object because it has perceptible qualities in common with it. The sign is indexical when it is taken to stand for an object because it has a relation of actual contiguity (spatial, temporal, or causal) with that object. The relation is symbolic when the sign is taken to stand for an object because of a norm in the community…These three types of ground are not exclusive

Note ( p. 4)

Sentences as composite signs

Highlight ( p. 5)

One view of speech-with-gesture composites is that the relation between co-expressive hand and word is a reciprocal one: “the gestural component and the spoken component interact with one another to create a precise and vivid understanding” (Kendon 2004: 174,

Highlight ( p. 6)

Any utterance is a situated unit of social behaviour with causes (or conditions) and effects (Goffman 1964; Schegloff 1968). An utterance forms as the product of some kind of obligation and ends in the accountability of the speaker towards what they communicated

Note ( p. 6)

also the expectations toward the listener/communicative partner to recognise and respond

Highlight ( p. 6)

While diachronic analysis is concerned with relations between data from different years (with no specified type or directness of causal/conditional relations), enchronic analysis is concerned with relations between data from neighbouring moments, adjacent units of behaviour in locally coherent communicative sequences (typically, conversations).

Highlight ( p. 7)

A move may be defined as a recognizable unit contribution of communicative behaviour constituting a single, complete pushing forward of an interactional sequence by means of making some relevant social action recognizable (e.g., requesting the salt, passing it, saying Thanks).

Highlight ( p. 7)

A conventional…sign is found when people take a certain signifier to stand for a certain signified because that is what members of their community normatively do

Highlight ( p. 8)

Non-conventional signs, by contrast, are found when people take certain signifiers to stand for certain signifieds not because of previous experience with that particular form-meaning pair or from social convention, but where the standing-for relation between form and meaning comes about by virtue of just that singular event of interpretation.

Highlight ( p. 8)

The symbolic indexical is a hybrid of the two types conventialized form, contextual meaning

Highlight ( p. 8)

But only conventional signs (including conventional components of symbolic indexicals) necessarily have both type and token identities.

Highlight ( p. 9)

we may define the composite utterance as a communicative move that incorporates multiple signs of multiple types.

Highlight ( p. 11)

A relation of a sign standing for an object is iconic when the sign is taken to stand for the object because it has perceptible qualities in common with it. The sign is indexical when it is taken to stand for an object because it has a relation of actual contiguity (spatial, temporal, or causal) with that object. The relation is symbolic when the sign is taken to stand for an object because of a norm in the community

Image ( p. )

These three types of ground are not exclusive,

📚 Investigate

Highlight ( p. 690)

(neo-)Peircean semiotics (e.g., Colapietro 1989; Kockelman 2005; Parmentier 1994; Peirce 1955) and (neo-)Gricean pragmatics (e.g., Atlas 2005; Grice 1975; Horn 1989; Levinson 1983, 2000; Sperber and Wilson 1995)

Note ( p. 695)

are there non-hand gestures?

Note ( p. 698)

me no understand

Highlight ( p. 702)

There is considerable controversy as to how, if at all, gesture and sign language are to be compared (see Emmorey and Reilly 1995). Why is sign language even called sign language?

Highlight ( p. 2)

(neo-)Peircean semiotics (e.g., Colapietro 1989; Kockelman 2005; Parmentier 1994; Peirce 1955) and (neo-)Gricean pragmatics (e.g., Atlas 2005; Grice 1975; Horn 1989; Levinson 1983, 2000; Sperber and Wilson 1995).

Note ( p. 7)

are there non-hand gestures?

Note ( p. 10)

me no understand

Highlight ( p. 14)

There is considerable controversy as to how, if at all, gesture and sign language are to be compared (see Emmorey and Reilly 1995). Why is sign language even called sign language?

⭕ Caveats/Lookup

Highlight ( p. 689)

This is helped by the binding power of social cognition in an enchronic context (that is, the sequential context of turn-by-turn conversation), in particular the assumption that people are not merely saying things but making moves.

Highlight ( p. 701)

But loudness is a single dimension, because it is impossible to produce a word simultaneously at two different volumes

Highlight ( p. 1)

This is helped by the binding power of social cognition in an enchronic context (that is, the sequential context of turn-by-turn conversation), in particular the assumption that people are not merely saying things but making moves.

Highlight ( p. 13)

But loudness is a single dimension, because it is impossible to produce a word simultaneously at two different volumes.